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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the inherent opinions of “discursive practice” (Foucault) and presents, using a Matrix, a comparative 
analysis of “key concepts”.  
Endless numbers of opinions, with desirable or undesirable properties are possible. Deontology is able to differentiate 
between them, given its location at the intersection of the circles of morality and profession. This intersection is circumscribed 
by comparing epistemic (cognitive); rhetorical; and deontological enunciations. Each type of enunciation has its functors (It is 
– It is not; May be yes – May be not; Must – Must not); values (True – False; Plausible Implausible; and Correct – Incorrect); 
and specific subjective equivalents (Certainty (C1); Conviction (C2) and/or Faith (F); and Respect – Kant). Correctness is the 
basic principle of deontology, “political correctness” being only one of its forms. The deontological functor occupies a 
medium – mediating position: it opens the epistemic functor (where nothing is possible) and limits the rhetorical functor 
(where anything is possible). The deontological functor restricts possible opinions to their desirable sets, being the 
“Limitation that does not limit” (Noica). 
The matrix has seven levels and perspectives of analyses ranging from “writing” with its “zero degree”, between the 
ontological level (one) and the stylistic level (seven). A positive or negative Rule corresponds to each level. For instance, 
according to the Rule for the third level (Axiological), “Opinion must be the expression of freedom but also of responsibility. 
Otherwise it is either constraint, in which case it ceases to be an opinion, or arbitrary”. Although this suggested Code has 16 
Rules, this study includes only seven of them. Being an analysis as well as a discourse about opinion (a Meta-Opinion), this 
paper offers modern criteria in estimating existing opinions and improving possible ones. It contains, also, a Meta-Code for 
the future creation of specific professional codes in law; medicine; mass media etc.  
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1. Introduction 
Numerically and qualitatively, endless sets of opinions are possible. This paper aims to analyze the 
characteristics of the opinion; to identify the optimum ones; and to present them through a Deontological code of 
opinion containing 16 rules. Out of these, this analysis includes only seven of them. 
2. Theoretical Background 
In Ancient Greek, a distinction was made between “episteme” and “doxa”. The first meant true knowledge 
(knowledge of truth) whilst the second meant opinion (Peters, 1993, p. 67). There is also, another distinction 
between “on”, i.e. “that which is”; and “de on”, i.e. “that which is to be done”, or must be done. This is the origin 
of the term “deontology” which, in modern language means the Logic of action (Von Wright, 1982, pp. 18-33). 
The field of Deontology is situated at the intersection of two circles: of morality; and of profession. The 
intersection can be called, also, “deontic space” (C tineanu, 2008, pp. 25-29). There is a distinction between 
“deontic” and “deontological”; this is similar to the distinction between “ontic” and “ontological”. In order to 
circumscribe the sphere of opinion (“the universe of opinion”), I compared three types of enunciations which 
constitute the object of three theoretical disciplines. Each type of enunciation was associated with basic functors; 
specific values; and its subjective equivalent. 
 
 The cognitive enunciation is based on the existential functors: It is – It is not (I ~ I). It is associated with the 
epistemic values True – False (T-F) and it has Certitude (C1) as its subjective equivalent. A cognitive 
enunciation is either certainly true or certainly false. Its status, as a hypothesis, is only provisional. Having 
gone through Demonstration, the hypothesis becomes either a true or a false enunciation. Whereas opinion, 
be it strengthened or weakened - through Argumentation (A)-, remains still an opinion. Several coherently 
organized enunciations constitute a Demonstration (D) and, ultimately, the axiomatic System. Cognitive 
enunciations are studied by Epistemology and Logics. 
 The rhetorical enunciation is based, as Sextus Empiricus (1965, pp. 231-245) said, on the rhetorical functors: 
May be yes – May be not (Mb ~ Mb). It is associated with the values Plausible – Implausible, and has as its 
subjective equivalent, Conviction (C2) and/or Faith (F). From a rhetorical angle, this enunciation is the 
opinion. Aristotle considered that Rhetoric is the doctrine of opinion. Any opinion can be expressed in an 
enunciation (“with a subject and predicate”) or it can be developed – as Discourse – through an entire 
Argumentation (A). Ancient Greek made the distinction between cognitive and rhetorical enunciations, 
namely between “episteme” and “doxa”; the second being the opinion. For the word “opinion”, modern 
languages use several synonyms such as view; point of view; perspective; angle etc. 
 The deontological enunciation is based on the deontic functors: Must – Must not (M ~ M) it is associated 
with the values Correct – Incorrect, and has Respect (R) as its subjective equivalent. Kant stated that respect 
was a mixture of fear and love. 
 
There is a complex and complicated relationship between the three types of enunciation. Firstly, it must be 
pointed out that cognitive and deontic enunciations have no degrees of comparison. A cognitive enunciation is 
either true or false and a deontic enunciation is either correct or incorrect. This feature can be applied also to their 
subjective equivalents since, neither certitude nor respect, have degrees of comparison. Conversely, a rhetorical 
enunciation can be more or less plausible or implausible respectively, because, as Protagoras stated, the 
arguments which support it, can be “stronger” or “weaker”; hence, his imperative “to make the weaker argument 
stronger”. Subjectively speaking, arguments can be more or less convincing and faith can be “stronger” or 
“weaker” since it can be strengthened or weakened. 
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Secondly, Axiology focuses on the relationship between the existential functor It is – It is not and the 
deontic functor Must - Must not. Kant (1969, pp.40-49) stated firmly that the two functors are opposed and 
separated by a gap which could not be overcome. As Hegel would have said, they are in a relationship of 
“mutual exteriority”. However, there are, at least, four possible relationships between the two functors: 
 
 It must be, but it is not; 
 It must not be, but it is; 
 It must not be and it is not;  
 It must be and it is (it is “all right”). 
 
    As far as rhetorical enunciations are concerned, opinion can be absolutely free when it does not contain a 
single molecule of Must – Must not. It is still an opinion when it contains It is – It is not; this is because simply 
it is an enunciation (“with a subject and predicate”) which states or denies something about something else. 
Without any trace of Must - Must not, opinion has an undetermined virtual space of manifestation which is 
potentially infinite. It is only the intervention of Must - Must not which can turn the undetermined opinion into 
a correct or incorrect one. The correct opinion is the one which is optimum (desirable). One can visualize the 
deontic functor in the middle; between the existential functor which, ultimately, can be tautological (A=A) and 
the rhetorical functor which, ultimately, can be absurd (A A). In a semi-metaphorical expression Must opens 
It is and limits May be. In Christian terms, Must is crucified between the “robber of poverty” on its left and 
“the robber of waste” on its right. In Noica’s words (1969), Must is “The limitation that doesn’t limit” (1969). 
Two partial conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis: 
 
    Any opinion formed at the intersection of the circles of morality and profession has two components: a 
moral (ethical) one and a professional one. Therefore, “professional deontology” is a partially 
tautological idiom. 
 Based on the functors’ functioning, and in order for an opinion to be correct or optimum, it must contain 
a cognitive (informative) component and a deontological (imperative) one. It must be mentioned that the 
first component is integrated (assimilated) into the second so that the cognitive (informative) component 
- if not absent – can be masked, invisible and, therefore, implicit. In this case, it can be extracted 
hermeneutically from the subtext (Ducrot, 1972, p.61). 
 
3. The History of Opinion 
Only three essential moments are presented here. 
3.1. Protagoras’ paradigm (Reding, 1985, p.15) 
This paradigm can be reduced to three statements. The first states that there are, at least, two possible opinions 
about anything in this World. Consequently, opinion is considered to be universal: any enunciation is only an 
opinion. The second states that each individual, engaged in a dialogue or dispute (Peter and Paul, i.e. P1 and P2), 
is obliged to “make the weaker argument stronger”, as already mentioned above. Nevertheless, by doing so, the 
dispute, between P1 and P2, remains everlastingly open and only an exterior factor can stop it (“shut” it); for 
instance, the censorship which shuts ones mouth. Billig (1987, p. 93) states: “As Protagoras’s maxim would 
suggest, claim and counter-claim can be made indefinitely”. Protagoras’ third statement says that any opinion is 
based on an opportunity (utility) factor; later, this is called interest. 
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3.2. Aristotle’s contribution (Aristotle, 2004, pp. 83-111) 
Aristotle was deeply scandalized by Protagoras’ theory which made opinion universal. Therefore, he corrected 
it from several angles out of which two were essential. Firstly, he made the distinction between logical 
enunciations (which may be true or false) and rhetorical enunciations (opinions which can be only plausible or 
implausible). Also, synonyms such as “credible – incredible”, “verisimilar – not verisimilar” or “likely – 
unlikely” can be included here. This is how Aristotle developed the theory of the difference between logical 
Demonstration and rhetorical Argumentation (D A), and that between Analytics and Dialectics respectively. 
Dialectics deals with opinion in general, whilst Rhetoric, as a “counter part” of Dialectics deals with common, 
everyday opinions. Opinion (“doxa”) is defined as “that which can also be different from what it is now”. 
Secondly, Aristotle circumscribed the referential field of opinion to the three oratorical genres: deliberative (in 
Politics); juridical (in Law); and epideictic (in Anniversary situations which celebrate people; institutions; and 
gods). Aristotle’s first contribution remains valid, whilst Perelman corrected the second. 
3.3. Perelman’s extension (Perelman, Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 2000, p.7) 
Perelman considered that there was no reason (“raison”) to reduce the object of Rhetoric to the three oratorical 
genres. Based on, the neo-Kantian distinction between Existential Judgements (Ex. J) and Evaluative Judgements 
(Ev. J), Perelman extended the sphere of opinion to all forms of Culture with the exception of natural Sciences 
(called also “exact” Sciences). He believed that the term “dialectics” was compromised by Hegel and Marx who 
“ontologised” it. Consequently, he replaced it with “Neorhetoric”. Perelman’s Neorhetoric reached the 
“Rhetorical Empire”. Within this extension process, discourse (limited in space and time) becomes discursivity; 
this characterizes any persuasive form of communication which uses Argumentation (A). In fact, Perelman 
extended the sphere of Argumentation, but failed to clarify the difference between Argumentation and 
Demonstration (A D). The recent contribution of a group, lead by De Coorebyter (1994, pp. 1-4) extended, also, 
Rhetoric’s sphere to the Natural Sciences. 
There were three attempts to unify all forms of Culture. The first two occurred in Psychology (19th century) 
and in the Philosophy of Culture (20th century). Both failed. Currently, the third attempt is ongoing in the field of 
Rhetoric (21the century). 
4. Norms – Principles – Codes 
Cognitive enunciations are organized in theories (with different degrees of generality) and, ultimately in 
axiomatic systems. Normative enunciations (norms) are organized in normative systems. If norms operate 
spontaneously, they form a custom (tradition) and, if they are expressed explicitly, they compose a code. The 
above-mentioned distinction (the deontic space seen as an intersection) enables the differentiation between moral 
norms (general); professional norms (specific or “technical”); and deontic norms (particular). The dialectical 
formula G – P - I is applied here. Von Wright (1982, pp.18-33) used a similar classification.  
Principles constitute the basis of normative systems (customs or codes) and, in real life, define how norms are 
understood (decoded) and applied “de facto” and “de jure”. Christians et al. (2001, pp.23-30) consider that, in 
moral life, (i.e. from the point of view of Ethics) five Principles could be identified. These were: Measure 
(Aristotle); Usefulness (Mill); Duty (Kant); The Veil of Ignorance (Rawls); and Judeo-Christian Love. However, 
this list failed to include the Principle of Renunciation, specific to the Buddhist vision of the World. I consider 
that the Principle of Efficiency - rigorously defined by Pragmatism - underlies the professional codes. 
In the previously published, Deontology of mass-media (C tineanu, 2008), I argued that Correctness is the 
Principle of any Deontology, “political correctness” being only a special, political form of correctness. Numerous 
heterogeneous Codes mix Principles and Norm types or Norm components. When referring to moral (ethical) and 
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professional components, Deaver (2004, p. 169) noted that most Deontological Codes use “maximal” ethical 
standards and “minimal” professional standards and, for most of the time, the two types never intersect. The 
Hippocratic Oath is a classical and perennial Code. It is a model deontological Code, in which medical and moral 
components correlate perfectly.  
Therefore, opinions may be correct or incorrect whilst deontological codes establish sets of Rules which draw 
the boundaries between the optimum opinion and all its incorrect deviations, even if the latter are both possible 
and plausible. 
5. The Matrix and the Levels 
The structure, of any spiritual or practical entity, contains several levels. These can be analyzed from seven 
wide perspectives. The Matrix, proposed here as a method, opens and applies these perspectives. Only seven 
Rules - corresponding to the level of the Matrix - are tackled next. Firstly, the Rules are presented both in their 
desirable and undesirable form; then, they are explained and exemplified. 
 
5.0. Level zero (0) 
 
Although “a gestures’ syntax” is possible also, this is the level of pure grammatical expression. In other words, 
from an axiological point of view, this is the level of “writing”, or the “zero degree” (Barthes, 1953). The 
stylistics level (nr. 7) overlaps this first level. 
5.1. The ontological level 
The ontological basis of opinion is and must be the Possible. Otherwise, opinions can’t be transposed into 
deeds and remain simple utopias. By definition, utopia is postponed everlastingly and waited for ceaselessly (as 
in Waiting for Godot). 
Existence and Non-Existence are present on the ontological level. Existence is the ontological basis of Speech 
and Utterance, whilst Non-Existence is the ontological basis of Silence. In its turn, placed between Necessity and 
Hazard (accident, occurrence), Existence contains, also, in its sphere, the Possible whose degree is given and 
measured by the Probable. Within the structure of opinion, the Probable-Possible is expressed directly in the 
rhetorical functor: May be yes – May be not. The saying “better is the enemy of good” can be interpreted in the 
spirit of the first Rule, i.e. something “well” done is preferable to something possibly “better”. Another saying 
explains the meaning of enmity: “The road to hell is paved with good intentions”. 
5.2. The logical – epistemic level 
Opinion has and must have two components: a cognitive one; and an evaluative one. If opinion contains only 
the first component, it becomes a cognitive enunciation (which may be true or false). If opinion contains only the 
second component, it becomes a mere arbitrary state of mind. Hegel would call it “the subjective arbitrary”; 
Ayer, an “interjection”; and Caragiale, a “fancy”. 
“It’s raining” is a cognitive enunciation if it is really raining outside, i.e. if the rain can be seen really or felt. A 
statement, such as “Oh, I like it when it rains”, expresses only a subjective state of mind which is void of 
information (except for self referential information). However, when P1 states that “Rain is good as it helps 
plants to grow”, he expresses an opinion, he is for. Yet, P2 provides an argument against this, by saying: “When 
it rains, weeds grow, and flooding might occur”. P1 replies: “If it doesn’t rain, there’s drought, which is worse 
than flooding”. 
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 This is how, for - against arguments emerge as in Protagoras’ paradigm. The dispute can be stopped only by 
Bul  (the traditional protagonist in Romanian jokes) who believes strongly that there is enough water in 
Romania; the only problem being, its poor distribution between draughts and floods. Thus, the dispute moves to 
the level of responsibility. This level involves the whole Argumentation theory. “This is how I see things” or “It 
seems to me that… ” are not arguments but mere subjective and arbitrary states of mind. 
5.3. The axiological level 
Opinion is and must be free but also responsible. Responsibility involves care (“Sorge”, as Heidegger called 
it) for the consequences (impact) of one’s deeds upon the other/s. If opinion is not free, it is constrained and, if it 
is constrained, it ceases to be an opinion. In this case, opinion is “reduced to silence”, or it is “dictated” from 
outside by someone or something else. On the other hand, if opinion is free but not responsible, freedom becomes 
libertinism or libertinage. This is the greatest risk and danger of freedom turned into libertinism: anyone can say 
anytime and anywhere, anything and anyhow about anyone or anything. In the case of guilt, we face the 
phenomenon of (moral and lawful) responsibility transfer. It is not I, but P1 or P2, the President of the country, or 
God Almighty who is guilty and, therefore, responsible for this or that.  
Characterization, either univocal or mutual (reciprocal) is involved in such cases. “Liar” is the most harmless 
epithet. It is fallowed usually by insults; defamation; calumny (also sanctioned by Law). In such cases, the ones 
who state such opinions often fail to realize that, actually, any such characterization is implicitly a self-
characterization.  
5.4. The psychological level 
Opinion is and must be the expression of a conviction and /or faith; and not necessarily of a certainty. In other 
words, opinion is and must be the expression of the inner Self, not only of the Ego. The inner Self is the coherent 
ensemble of certainties; convictions; and faith of a given individual or collective Subject. Here, the elements of 
certainty (7+5=12) are subordinated and integrated. 
The inner Self is not only psychological but, also, axiological; the Ego is only psychological, and any 
individual Subject has an Ego. Therefore, according to the psychological mechanism of hypocrisy, the same 
Subject can simulate an opinion and dissimulate another one. The first opinion is the desirable pretext; the second 
one is the undesirable cause. Consequently, the pretext activates the cause at the same time disguising it. This 
mechanism both motivates and justifies the action. It is an incorrect mechanism which manipulates the other/s. 
The optimum opinion is authentic and sincere, not hypocritical. It must also be mentioned that the collective 
inner Self correlates with common sense (Marica, 1998, p.80). Common sense is “a warehouse” (Cicero) of 
“common places”, from where the orator extracts his arguments (Aristotle). According to Boudon, (1990, p. 392), 
arguments can be psychologically and sociologically “doubtful” (uncertain), even false, and yet, efficient. 
However, Psychology and Sociology record a “de facto” situation incriminated by Deontology from the 
perspective of the “de jure” situation through the distinction between what is correct and incorrect. 
5.5. The praxeological level 
Opinion is and must be based on interest, an “opportunity” factor (as Protagoras called it). The interest, itself, 
must be correct (or “fair” as the Illuminists put it) and it is so, when it observes Legal Laws and Ethical Norms. 
Hypocrisy and manipulation are involved in the achievement of an incorrect interest (see the fourth Rule). 
The optimum opinion must be, also, the answer to the theme – problem – solution triad. Otherwise, it remains 
a fantasy. An opinion emerges only when humans face a theme containing a problem which calls for a solution. 
This is where deliberation or for and against arguments intervene either outside (between P1 and P2) or within 
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the inner Self (Hamlet’s “To be or not to be”). If an opinion is wrong (incorrect), the actions which fallow it and 
their consequences are complete failures. Althusser’s well known “theoretical practice” and the “discursive 
practice” (Foucault, 1999, p. 55) belong, also, to the same fifth Rule. 
5.6. The sociological level 
The optimum opinion, either individual or collective, is and must be a synapse which correlates relationships 
of interest between individuals or between individuals and groups. Otherwise, divergent opinions generate 
conflicts; divisions; and misunderstandings. This is where “social characters” enter the scene as authors; actors; 
actants. When verbal communication is employed, the participants are actants, and, in Voyenne’s “collective 
communication”, transparency becomes the ideal. The basis, of collective communication, is social (socio-
professional groups and their relationships). The currently increasing social polarization (a few have 
progressively more, whilst the many have progressively less) matches Eminescu’s verse: “De i vorbe ti pe în eles 
/ Eu nu te pot pricepe” (“Although you speak perceptively / I cannot understand you”). Eminescu’s verse 
provides us with the non-transparency equation. 
5.7. The stylistic level 
The verbal or non-verbal expression of opinion is and must be clear; coherent; and concise, according to the 
classical conditions of discourse and discursivity. The seventh Rule may be called, also, “The Golden Rule” of 
discursive expression. Otherwise, the expression (just like the expressed opinion) becomes obscure, incoherent, 
diluted (speech becomes “chit-chatting”). The zero level, with its “zero degree”, which characterizes “writing”, 
leads to the stylistic level. If authentic and not kitsch, style solves a paradox. On the one hand, style is unique and 
unrepeatable whilst, on the other hand, it is recognizable in all its expressions (in various texts and contexts). 
Reboul(1983, p. 73) defined Non-paraphrasing as a stylistic Principle of the discourse. An authentic discourse 
can be neither imitated nor paraphrased. Also, style is seductive by definition and, therefore, persuasive since it 
forms or strengthens the other/s conviction or faith. Out of Maiorescu’s Oratori, Retori i Limbu i (Orators, 
Rhetors and Chatterboxes) (1984, pp. 148-187), only the Orator has style, while the Rhetor, if other than Cicero 
or Quintilian, is didactic and artificial. The chatterbox is just that, a chatterbox. 
6. Level Distribution in Verbal Expression 
This is where we close the hermeneutical circle of the analysis and of the verbal expression. In conclusion: 
 
 The ontological and logical-epistemic levels (1&2) are present in the Text. 
 The axiological and psychological levels (3&4) are present in the Subtext. 
 The praxeological and sociologic levels (5&6) are present in the Context. 
 The grammatical and stylistic levels (0&7) are present in the Inter-Text. 
 
The relationships, between all these levels, are based on a generic relationship called Inherence. To give a 
profane example, “white, hard and sweet” are the inherent characteristics of a sugar cube (Hegel, 1985, pp. 49-
58). To give a sacred example, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are inherent hypostases of the unique 
Christian God. Similarly, the seven features, expressed in the seven deontological Rules, are inherent to the 
optimum (correct) opinion. 
 
 
157 Tudor Cătineanu /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  92 ( 2013 )  150 – 157 
7. Corollary 
Our analysis (approach and discourse) aimed to optimize opinion, especially nowadays when correct but 
mostly incorrect opinions proliferate “sans rivage”/endlessly. In addition to being guidelines for the future 
opinions, the Matrix and its inherent Method may be the landmarks of further comprehensive and accurate 
studies of past or present opinions. However, when applied to opinion, even our complex Matrix represents a 
“point of view”; it is an opinion about opinion. Consequently, this paper is, also, a Meta - Opinion. 
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